











The Brain -- is wider than the Sky -- 1 
 
 
Married to an absent military man, the virtuous Présidente de Tourvel, in Choderlos de 
Laclos’s Les liaisons dangereuses, is one of literature’s great epistolary victims. Step by step, the 
reader follows her fall - her seduction by the rogue Valmont - as her letter-writing style 
disintegrates: controlled, lucid, elegant prose at first; desperate, choked and formless later on. 
Clarity of purpose is Valmont’s chosen weapon for the duel he sets up between resistance 
and conquest. His strategy is to feign virtue, both in word and in action. His tactic is 
persuasion. Persuasion wins: Valmont’s reasons overwhelm those of ‘la belle Prude’; his 
style, a feat of rhetorical manipulation, sways her. Once unleashed, her sentiments are 
uncensored. They lie beyond the scope of rhetorical description because, by the end, they are 
the truth of her present, corporeal, entirely passionate state - unclothed, even transparent. By 
contrast, Valmont’s partner-in-crime, the powerful Marquise de Merteuil, cultivates a 
lucidity, a literally admirable brilliance, that clothes her passions and emotional play.  
All the action in this novel is epistolary. It is entirely made out of verbalized, 
communicated knowledge, reasoned argumentation and subjectively ordered narrative. Its 
subject-matter is sexual seduction, of course, but beyond that, in its very form it explores 
how discursive reason is embedded within emotivity, how emotivity may become entwined 
around discursive reason, and how the two manipulate and mold each other. Self-
consciousness is pursued through the act of writing, during the taking-stock of emotional 
life. For the reader, this self-consciousness fails to mask the self-deceit it burnishes, while, 
for the cynical protagonists, emotions and passions are the mere details without which there 
would be no game. The novel stages the thinking, political, strategic mind, operating within a 
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context of refined but already decadent and self-destructive libertinage. Valmont and especially 
Merteuil are the intelligent instigators of action, and the body’s passions are not so much the 
center of action as its tool.  
Les liaisons dangereuses had its first print run in 1782. Clarissa, published some thirty-
five years earlier, is often cited as its immediate antecedent, and probably should be 
discussed in this context. But my purpose is not to tell a history of the epistolary novel in the 
Enlightenment; nor to explore the development of ‘sensibility’ in the period. I began in pre-
Revolutionary France, so late in the day with respect to the title of this paper, in order to be 
in a position now to retrace the origins of this view, at once familiar and sophisticated, of the 
mutual enforcement of potent reason and forceful sentiment. The interplay of the one with 
the other is the stuff that ethical deliberation works with; and such deliberation gains from 
exposure to a literary vocabulary which encapsulates, rather than analyses, what is entailed 
for the human observer to make intellectual sense of the diverse, inter-connected strata that 
constitute our emotional and mental lives. In both content and form, the epistolary exertions 
of Les liaisons dangereuses embody this drive to observe emotion and behaviour through the 
sole means of the rational mind. The situation of the Présidente de Tourvel until her 
seduction illustrates the two-way relation of reason and emotion perfectly: a sense of despair 
(emotion A) which arises out of an attachment (emotion B) that destroys social and 
psychological order and appeals to vanity (emotion C) coexists with a moral sentiment 
whose very existence depends on the awareness of a primitive conflict between appetite and 
duty. This moral sentiment, in turn, can give rise to the fear (emotion D) that it will not be 
strong enough to sustain the rationally mediated awareness of consequence. Embedded 
within the conception of moral action is thus a series of emotions, joined together to form 
the psychological and epic narrative of the event.  
Deliberations about moral action still tend to be connected, however subtly, to the 
Cartesian notion of a self split between steady, supervising reason - imbued with knowledge 
of what constitutes right action - and fluctuating passion - itself ‘right’ insofar as a beautiful 
object, say, might ‘rightly’ trigger the desire to possess it. But this Platonic, divided self is not 
as clear-cut in its duality as stereotypical notions of the rationalist, post-Cartesian, 
Enlightenment era would have it. The realm of knowledge was gradually redefined during 
the period known as the Scientific Revolution, in the early Enlightenment; so was the mind 








Aristotelian approaches to emotion. Susan James, in her book on the emotions in the 
seventeenth century, remarked on the ‘parodic interpretation of the processes by which 
knowledge is attained’ that results from ‘splitting off reason from passion’2, and noted that 
this division has nourished the practice of mainstream analytic philosophy as much as the 
study of early modern philosophy. The trend is in the process of being reversed by now. 
Emotions are, in effect, the talk of the town; and philosophical and scientific research on 
emotions is yielding a much more complex picture of what boundaries exist - if any - 
between reason and emotion.3 But I would like to show that the historical analysis of this 
subtle, perhaps merely epistemically valid division can bear philosophical fruit especially in 
the context of the growing body of scientific work on the nature of emotion, which Susan 
James does not consider. Emotions are part of the discourse of ethics, which themselves are 
often related to the philosophy of action and to metaphysics; but the possibility of 
accounting for emotions in scientific terms forces a confrontation, much more rare, between 
the realms of ethics, on the one hand, and of the sort of philosophy of mind which takes on 
the brain sciences, on the other. Ethics and the philosophy of action take for granted the 
existence of an agency - a rational and emotional mind. But what is this biological mind that 
is capable of agency? Can the mind that is the subject of ethical deliberation be the same 
mind - the brain - that is the object of empirical study? 
The title of this paper, then, is misleading. I will be concerned with reason, with 
emotion, and with the early Enlightenment. But my central focus is the fate of the sense of 
value - ethical or aesthetic - in the ‘disenchanted’ world of our scientific, digital age. Since the 
sense of value is inflected emotionally, we need to examine the psychological status of 
scientific accounts of human emotion, and the role of reason in explaining emotion. Insofar 
as this question is a take on the so-called mind-body problem, it is a philosophical one; but 
the approach here will be genealogical, rather than partaking specifically and exclusively of 
either the history of philosophy or the history of science, the philosophy of mind, or the 
cognitive sciences. In this way, I do not deal directly with the scientific literature on 
emotions, much of it fascinating, which is growing every day. Rather, I shall recount how 
early modern treatises which were concerned with the body’s passions dealt with the notion 
of moral responsibility. During the seventeenth century, traditional, broadly Galenic 
assumptions about the humoural, hydraulic nature of emotions were integrated into the new, 








Cartesians generally - as well as into the anti-mechanist, anti-dualist streams that would later 
feed into sensationalism. My ultimate purpose, again, is to address in this diachronic manner 
the technically arduous but important question of how a naturalistic understanding of the 
mind, such as that given by the cognitive sciences today, can be reconciled with a 
foundationalism with regard to ethics - or, succinctly put, how we can hold on to value in 




The difficulty of answering this question is in part due to the complexity of the very 
operation of asking it. In the Spectator of July 2nd, 1712, Joseph Addison (1672-1719) mused 
about ‘the proper limits, as well as the defectiveness, of our imagination; how it is confined 
to a very small quantity of space, and immediately stopped in its operations, when it 
endeavours to take in very great, or very little.’ Imagination was here depicted as a container 
of sorts which marked the concrete, outer boundary of reason. Reason, wrote Addison, was 
capable of pursuing ‘a particle of matter through an infinite variety of divisions’,  
but the fancy soon loses sight of it, and feels in itself a kind of chasm, that wants to 
be filled with matter of a more sensible bulk. We can neither widen nor contract the 
faculty to the dimensions of either extreme. The object is too big for our capacity, 
when we would comprehend the circumference of a world, and dwindles into 
nothing, when we endeavour after the idea of an atom. 
 
It was very well to derive knowledge from indirect sense-experience that there existed 
infinitely large and infinitely small dimensions; but the fancy - the imagination - was incapable 
of doing much about it. Reason had its reasons, while we were bound to fancies of our own 
dimension. We could not imagine ourselves out of our human sphere, however capable we 
were of accepting as reasonable the knowledge that other dimensions existed, and that we 
were experientally bound within this limited sphere of ours. Experience, in other words, had 
little to do with reason’s work.  
 A few years earlier, Locke had expressed a similar notion in his Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding: acknowledging that there were hidden worlds - such as particles within 
blood - which it was the mission of the natural sciences to uncover, he nevertheless hesitated 








with any alteration of our senses, he wrote, ‘the appearance and outward Scheme of things 
would have quite another Face to us; and I am apt to think, would be inconsistent with our 
Being’, for they would ‘produce quite different Ideas in us’ (II, xxii, 12). Hidden worlds could 
unsettle our gaze and our position in the naturally knowable world. Lockean ideas originated 
in the senses; but they were cogitations produced by the imagination. At once dependent on 
our senses and limited by them, the eighteenth-century imagination was central to ordinary 
cognition and to the capacity for wonder, but also a measure of what one should deem 
‘inconsistent with our Being’. 
I would like to stay for a while with this notion that a form of knowledge may be 
‘inconsistent with our Being’. The immediate, historical context of this statement deflates it 
somewhat, if one considers that Locke was, generally, trying to define what constituted the 
bounds within which human knowledge was possible, and desirable in social terms. Taken 
on its own, however, the statement certainly points to the centrality of the knower’s mind in 
evaluating the usability, that is, the relevance of scientific data. Awareness of the problems 
that naturalism has posed to epistemology was well summed up by Quine in 1969, in 
‘Epistemology Naturalized’, where he contraposed the ‘meager input’ of natural causes into 
our senses and the ‘torrential input’ of scientific knowledge. In a similar way, naturalistic 
accounts of emotion, passed on from antiquity, posed - and failed to resolve - the question 
of the status of the new science with regard to the morally perplexed, emotionally confused, 
natural (embodied, humoural) but socialized (communicating, verbal) human being, still well 
represented, decades after Locke, by our Présidente de Tourvel. The unease generated today 
by the expulsion of teleology from the biological analysis of mind, emotion and 
consciousness is not very different from this early modern distrust of naturalism. This 
distrust is a matter of some complexity, at a time when life sciences - particularly genetics 
and the neurosciences - are growing in sophistication, that is, in their capacity to give us a 
sharp picture of the structures of which our organisms are made. Brain imaging techniques 
are helping us identify in increasingly precise terms what is going on in the brain when we 
feel pain, for instance, or when we recognize the face of a loved one.  
But our experience of fear, or of facial recognition, is very different in kind from our 
perception of whatever we are able to detect on an fMRI scan. Granted, this trivial 
difference should not detract from the explanatory value of brain imaging techniques, but it 








methodology of science to the study of human subjectivity. So for example, it is hard to 
know what to make of an evolutionary account of anger, say, or what to do with a 
neurobiological analysis of fear. Even if one accepts that a mental state, such as fear, is fully 
reducible to its cerebral correlates, such as activity in the amygdala, the awareness of this 
reducibility will have nothing to do with the experience of fear and will not formally differ, 
in the first instance, from the very different claim that fear is merely redescribable as activity 
in the amygdala. In this way, a naturalized, biological account - whether evolutionary, 
modular, or neurophysiological - of fear or jealousy will not automatically help us know how 
to act in the presence of these emotions: raw descriptions of this sort are indeed value-free 
from an ethical point of view.  
On the other hand, the view that mental events bear a causal or functional relation 
with the brain’s biochemistry can have instrumental value when applied to the care of mental 
illnesses amenable to chemical treatments. Jonathan Glover recently devoted his Tanner 
lectures to what he has named ‘humanist psychiatry’, which acknowledges schizophrenic, or 
manic-depressive, or ‘split-personality’ patients as whole persons - and thus full moral agents 
regardless of their state of mind - and takes seriously the ill-defined nature of the boundary 
between the person and the illness. The problems addressed in those lectures are increasingly 
discussed within the fields of ethics and the philosophy of psychiatry. But a philosopher of 
mind might argue that the foundations of Glover’s laudable stance depend on a conclusive 
account of the ways in which a relation of some sort between mental events and brain states 
is non-deterministic with regard to a sense of selfhood, consciousness and so on. If one 
prescribes Prozac on the perfectly plausible basis that depression is, to some extent, or, as 
might be the case, fully caused by a dysfunction of serotonin secretion, what exactly are the 
criteria for evaluating the border beyond which the person’s sense of self is not fully 
determined by neurotransmitters? In other words, how do we find out what, the person or 
the illness, the psychiatrist is treating, and how do we define the one versus the other? And 
if, conversely, the ‘person’ is definable, say, in terms of the Lockean concept of a unity of 
self, where does that leave our limited knowledge of cerebral activity? Shouldn’t we at least 
be referring to those amply documented, but not fully interpreted, stories of brain-damaged 
patients whose body-image has changed dramatically?4 It is probably true that the 








determinism can, and should, be kept apart from all levels of reductionism. But the 
conceptual moves to do so are complex, and, again, inconclusive.5 
Such questions might not seem problematic from a scientific point of view, but this 
is precisely why they do promise much philosophical meat: as Andrew Solomon wrote in his 
book on depression, The Noonday Demon, ‘Hippocrates is, in effect, the grandfather of Prozac; 
Plato is the grandfather of psychodynamic therapy’.6 In crude terms, one may say that the 
one trades in physical events - effects; while the other deals with - putative - mental causes. 
At issue is the problem of bringing the two together to form one account, if not one 
practice. This cannot be a simple task, partly, or perhaps especially because of the very 
nature of the mind without which there would be no scientific enquiry in the first place. 
When I am sad, say, or feel emotionally confused, I can be sure that reason stands, 
untouched, a constant observer, a guarantor of the self’s narrative unity. The differentiation 
of the ‘emotional’ brain from the traditionally ‘higher’, neo-cortical, thinking brain, matches 
our introspective sense of a functional division between the two contemporary events. But 
this sense is itself fragile. Certain cases of brain-damage can distort precisely the sense of the 
unity of consciousness, of Kant’s ‘transcendental unity of apperception’. Our capacity to 
postulate theories about the world and about ourselves is not immune from error. Yet the 
possibility that our capacity to posit a concept such as ‘transcendental’ might well be a 
product of brain structure need not unravel the very bearing of the concept of 
‘transcendental’.  
 
Emotions are complex partly because they are the product of perceptions or sensations, and 
sometimes of thoughts, and can themselves cause further perceptions, sensations or 
thoughts. They can range from sense-driven reactions to overlapping cognitive states such as 
those experienced by the Présidente de Tourvel, and which involve appetite, thought, and 
will, as well as the sadness, despair, anger and joy that, for the scholastics7 as much as for 
contemporary emotion theorists like Paul Ekman,8 are a few of the ‘officially’ registered 
emotions. The new science of emotions, however, is as young as is ancient the art of 
observing them; and it is faced with the humanist’s interpretive difficulties shared by all mind 
sciences. This is why a historical perspective helps. The first-century physician and 
philosopher Galen understood emotion as humoural, as the product, or equivalent, or 








notion gave rise to are, in some sense, still ours. Again, and as I’ll explain in a minute, the 
physiology derived from Galen remained standard fare beyond revolutions in anatomy from 
the sixteenth century on - which revised many Galenic beliefs about anatomy previously held 
as sacrosanct - and beyond the breakdown, during the scientific revolution in the 
seventeenth century, of the faculty psychology on which this physiology depended.  
But as with most tenacious models, major presuppositions about the nature of 
mental function remained beyond the demise of faculty psychology, even as their meaning 
and import shifted along with the culture - and beyond Descartes. Passions continued for a 
while to be tied to the irascible and concupiscible functions of the sensitive soul of the 
scholastics, that is, to motions that were triggered by exposure to objects liable to cause 
passions. Treatises on the passions which dealt with such matters were conceived as moral 
guides; but their basic assumptions concerning the mind-body interaction were informed by 
this hybrid psychology whose roots were historically ‘long’ and whose outlook was not 
especially novel. The very language of such treatises came from Plato and Aristotle via 
Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, and was rooted in the ground of Stoicism and 
Epicureanism. Within that scheme, reason had the same relationship to passion as it did to 
body. 
François de La Mothe Le Vayer (1588-1672), for example, a statesman, magistrate, 
Pyrrhonist, scholar and tutor to the brother of Louis XIV, the Duc d’Anjou (later Duc 
d’Orléans), in his didactic compendium De l’instruction de Monseigneur le Dauphin,9 argued that 
there was a fundamental difference between ‘moral action and human action’.10 Moral 
actions depended on the presence of the will, and of the understanding - ‘entendement’ - 
which was necessary to the will.11 Other human actions were those performed either under 
constraint, or by ‘madmen, little children, and sleepers’, or were indifferent gestures, which 
‘tended neither to vice, nor to virtue’ - those which ‘make you hop with joy, wander without 
a purpose, pick up a wisp of turf or brush up our moustache’.12 This sort of ethics was based 
on a voluntarism which guided at once conduct and deliberation about conduct, and which 
was a central feature of the Thomistic psychology favoured during the Renaissance. For La 
Mothe, we thus had two appetites, one rational - ‘raisonnable’ - and dependent on the will; 
the other sensitive, ‘sensible’, pertaining to beasts as well as passions. The sensitive appetite, 
in turn, was either concupiscible, and led us to seek out the good and flee the bad; or 








the concupiscible appetite.13 The functions of the rational appetite or soul differed from 
those of the sensitive appetite or soul, insofar as they pertained to cogitation, imagination 
and memory; reason was thus necessary to the existence of a moral sense which, in turn, was 
central to this picture of mental organization. Actions, whether good or bad, were excited by 
passions, wrote La Mothe, and so in order to understand actions, one had first to consider 
passions, ‘named perturbations by the Latin philosophers, and indeed they are natural 
emotions, which take place in the sensitive part [of the soul], where they are based’.14 Moral 
responsibility therefore depended on awareness mediated by reason, which, in turn, had a 
cognitive impact on the other appetites. 
On this basis, treatises on the passions could proceed apace, unimpeded by 
revolutions in physics or metaphysics. More to the point, practical guides to the well-being 
of noble souls belonged to the realm of moral philosophy, which itself included ethics, 
politics and economics. La Mothe’s guide - which was highly regarded in mid-18th-century 
France and was printed by the Dresden publishers of Hume in French15 - contained all three. 
Psychology was a different matter, and concerned the fate of the tripartite soul. Although, 
again, faculty psychology was rapidly losing credibility in the seventeenth century, it 
continued to be taught in schools, and, as is apparent here, in no way did it vanish overnight 
to be replaced wholesale by a brand new system. La Mothe was a savant who was happy to 
cite Clement of Alexandria’s epithet for lust, ‘la Metropolitaine de tous les Vices’, just as he 
was comfortable with the notion that young people, and all those who had boiling blood, 
were easily prone to entertain hope - on account of their inexperience - and that the old, 
whose blood was cold, found it hard to do so - because of their experience. (Blood seemed 
to be there for good form; but that in itself is significant.)  
The concordance of emotion with bodily motion was by that point a trope, 
sustaining treatises on physiognomy and aesthetics, as well as the practice of caricature, for 
instance. Marin Cureau de la Chambre, royal physician and one of the founding members of 
the Académie des Sciences created by Colbert in 1666, began his own treatise on the 
passions with the popular view that ‘la Nature’ had endowed the human face with a faculty 
of expression akin to language, for the sake of ‘la vie Civile’ to which it, Nature, had destined 
man: ‘so that if his word were to belie his heart, his face would belie his word’.16 It was 
evident that ‘the body changes when the soul is moved’,17 and that emotions were made 








former type of character, were the internal emotion formed by the object in the appetite - 
actions were due to emotions that were caused by objects.18 The latter type of character was 
due to an ‘Air sur le visage’, a ‘je ne sçay quoy’ brought on by the passion, ‘and which virtue 
brings into its actions a certain grace, a pleasant counteance which is not found in vicious 
ones’.19 This ‘Air’ could be perceived in portraits: ‘the grace of a beautiful face can be 
expressed through colour’.20 Grace was inherent in the colour, figure and movement of parts 
and spirits, but, just as sounds were only pleasant insofar as they bore a certain proportion to 
one another, so these visual elements had to bear a relation to one another ‘which pleases 
the eye and contents the soul’.21 Beyond that, Cureau was not sure about what exactly grace, 
or that ‘Air’, was, but he was sure that it was contained within passions and moral actions, 
and that it was a function of movement. The cause of movement needed to be investigated 
in order for the nature of passions to be understood - emotions of the appetite ‘by which the 
soul moves towards the good and away from the bad’, through the agency of the animal 
spirits.22 The soul probably caused the spirits to move about in ways which depended on 
each passion, since the appetite - irascible or concupiscible - had a different emotion and 
goal for each passion.23 It also provoked those parts of the body which could engage in 
usually useful, well designed voluntary movement - although ‘How many wasted steps, 
ridiculous postures, and useless words in the passions?’24 The soul, in other words, used 
moral ‘Characteres’, through clear and distinct knowledge, in order to obtain what the 
passion was geared at obtaining; while the corporeal ‘Characteres’ were those it used purely 
by instinct, which arose without its intention.25  
This was an elaborate set of variations on a theme, an intricate, subtle danse around 
the spirits and moral mind. Its purpose was not to enlighten a young prince, in line with 
royal educational protocol, as was that of La Mothe’s treatise, but to demonstrate the 
centrality of proportion to moral worth, equated throughout with physical beauty.  The two 
treatises are each an instance of learned disquisition centered on commonly accepted 
theories of psychology. But classical erudition could merge with medical erudition, too, in a 
variety of ways, and  erudite anecdote could be paired with diagnostic conjecture. The soul, 
as we see, was defined by tradition, and its pathologies became the stuff of literature, 









the distraction of the mind, amongst other outward causes and perturbations, alters 
the temperature of the body, so the distraction and distemper of the body will cause 
a distemperature of the soul, and ‘tis hard to decide which of these two do more 
harm to the other. Plato, Cyprian, and some others (…) lay the greatest fault upon 
the soul, excusing the body; others again, accusing the body, excuse the soul, as 
principal agent.26 
 
The ascription of cause, action, diagnosis, judgement, scholarly source, could go 
round and round, yielding, for one, the riches of Burton’s ever popular tome. But the 
‘serious’ mind science, the equivalent, if you will, of our cognitive science (aloof from 
neuroanatomy as it often tends to be), was not being carried out by physicians, anatomists, 
natural philosophers, lawyers, state officials, or dilettantes of the soul: it was mainly in the 
hands of metaphysicians, including, of course, those bequeathed to the eighteenth century, 
and to the modern philosophical canon. Descartes, for whom medicine was all-important (it 
was, as he famously said, the highest branch of the tree of philosophy, whose trunk was 
physics and whose roots were metaphysics),27 did, certainly, bring about major intellectual 
changes. Yet his system, crucially, depended on its antecedents too.28 In a letter to his friend 
Regius, a Dutch physician at the university of Utrecht, he could thus write: ‘there is ‘only one 
soul in man, that is, the reasonable soul, for only actions which depend on reason can count as 
human actions’.29 The will was an aspect of reason, and could not be the efficient cause of 
physiological processes such as digestion or heart-beat, nor the immediate cause of physical 
motion, as was usually believed. Rather it determined the course of the animal spirits which 
travelled from the heart to the brain and from there to the muscles.30 Our soul was at once 
sensitive and rational; ‘and all its appetites are wills’.31 This is a suggestive instance of the 
historical positioning Descartes was effecting in order to succeed in his ambition to replace 
the Aristotelian system with his own: novel structures were dug within old turf.  
Likewise, for Descartes the mechanisms of sensation remained dependent on the 
motions of those ‘animal spirits’ which were constitutive of the original humours coursing 
through the body. It was also the case with emotion. Their lightness and velocity enabled 
spirits to travel from the heart to the brain, independently of the will. Even as he turned the 
mind into an unextended thinking thing, separate from the fully mechanized body, Descartes 
resorted to them to explicate the passions of the soul. These spirits were amphibian 








Emotional events thus remained identifiable with physiological ones, albeit this now 
mattered in the microscopic and causal, not in the macroscopic and merely anecdotal realm. 
And the more knowledge - revealed by medicine - one had about this nexus, the better 
equipped one was to deal with one’s passions.32 This physiology underlay a Stoicist sort of 
ethics, not dissimilar from that of the earlier Guillaume du Vair, say, or of Scipion Dupleix.33 
In the Principes de la philosophie, the Passions de l’âme and throughout his correspondence 
(especially in his letters to Princess Elisabeth), Descartes presented the view that it was the 
duty of ethics - the highest good in life - to define both what virtue was and the means, given 
our dual nature, to attain and live by it.34 And if medicine was instrumental in the realization of 
moral soundness, it was because ‘the spirit is so dependent on the temperament’.35  
This notion certainly introduces some murkiness into the purity of what is generally 
meant in modernity as Descartes’s avowed substance dualism (which in fact is of 
Augustinian pedigree rather than original to Descartes). For Descartes, in effect, the very 
process of formulating how physical and moral beings could regulate their behaviour so as to 
accommodate needs and duties to each other relied on the notion that the rational soul 
participated in the activities of what, until then, had been the appetitive and sensitive souls - 
and vice versa. The resulting picture of a humoural organism knowable by a reason that 
could inflect it did, however, rely on a dualist psychology, an implicit version of which was 
still bolstering in part the resistance of the ‘dévote’ Présidente de Tourvel to the disturbances 
of love - unsuccessfully, as it would turn out. But on her view, the mere attention to 
emotions, let alone passion-driven action, entailed the failure of virtue, rather than its 
pursuit. Once she had given in to her passion, however, attention to its object was itself an 
act of virtue - a justification she could use for believing in the rationality of her second-order 
decision to accept her first-order decision to give in to her inclination.  
Moral action, for the Présidente, thus entailed knowledge of causal relations, just as 
La Mothe and his contemporaries, as well as his predecessors like Scipion Dupleix,36 would 
have agreed; and knowledge of causal relations depended on ratiocination, on the 
‘entendement’, which in turn could bear on our emotional states. Descartes’s most 
noteworthy legacy to the later Enlightenment consisted in his relying in this way on the 
accessibility to the conscious mind of the phenomena of sense, including emotion, in order 
to turn self-consciousness into the proof of dualism. This was the novelty of the cogito: we 








discovered its nature. And once he had turned all consciousness, including that of emotion, 
into a feature of the disembodied soul, emotions themselves could seem mechanized, 
analysable by a rational, scientific mind - whether by the ordinary, emoting person, or by the 
natural philosopher. The resulting ‘man-machine’ quickly became a bogeyman, while atheism 
was easily imputed to those philosophers, most notably Hobbes and, in a league of his own, 
Spinoza, who wanted to show that the emotions - the internal world of the human subject - 
could be described in the same terms as those used to describe the physical world and our 
sense-mediated access to it.37  
 
The hiccupy but definite rise of naturalism in the seventeenth century - in the form of 
mechanism, corpuscularianism, versions of hylozoism and vitalism held by the likes of 
Leibniz and Stahl - was accompanied by the metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical 
uncertainties that resulted from squeezing Galenic and Aristotelian teleology out of the 
biological picture.38 As a result, it was tempting to mix and match old souls and new bodies - 
even without the teleology so perfectly preserved by Aristotle’s forms - as did the great 
physician and anatomist Thomas Willis, following the Gassendist trend of re-injecting 
vitalism into the machine of the body. Animal spirits in the sensus communis continued to play 
a central role with Willis, who differentiated their respective role in the cerebrum and in the 
cerebellum, and in the aetiolology and nosology of madness.39 By the late seventeenth 
century, psychiatry began to turn on the notion of nerves, although the soul remained a ‘fiery 
substance’ in the blood; senses were the passions of the soul, while motions were its actions, 
and both involved movements of the animal spirits, the soul’s ‘constitutive Particles, being 
moved somewhere in the System of the Nerves’.40 The scheme of inner and outer senses 
remained. One Thomas Tryon (1634-1703) - ‘student of physick, writer, merchant’ - 
explicitly rejected Galen’s all-too-neat ‘Principle’ of the four humours as ‘Forms and Words, 
rather than Realities’, while concluding that ‘most Diseases arise, either from Irregular 
passions of the Mind, or poysonous ferments, occasioned by ill Dyet, or improper Physick 
of the Body’. It was the case, wrote Tryon, that: 
Madness and Phrensie do generally (…) arise and proceed from various Passions and 
extream Inclinations, Love, Hate, Grief, Covetousness, Dispair, and the like, which 
do (…) break forth, violate and destroy the five inward Senses of the Soul, whence 
the outward Senses do arise; So that the Soul loseth its distinguishing property, and 








it were without a Guide, and consequently such a Soul is unchain’d, or set at liberty 
from the dark Confinements of the grosser Senses and Reason, even as men in 
Dreams….’41   
 
The search for knowledge about the physical functions underlying, guiding or 
impeding human action can be undertaken either for the sake of morals; or for scientia, for its 
own sake - regardless of the eventual applicability of this knowledge to medicine and the like 
(or, within a teleological framework, of its contribution to the understanding of God’s 
creation). The latter would characterize our contemporary sciences, as well as the proud 
practitioners and defenders of the new science some three hundred years ago, who 
themselves recall the rationalists on the side of Hippocrates twenty five hundred years ago. 
The former would characterize treatises of moral philosophy so plentiful between the 16th 
and 18th centuries, such as that by La Mothe. The equivalents today might be the 
psychiatrists that people like Glover are trying to wean, if that is the correct verb, from the 
DSM. Perhaps only die-hard Cartesians like Malebranche, fearless materialists like Hobbes, 
and libertins like Guillaume Lamy, precursors of a La Mettrie, and of course of a Laclos, 
would have identified themselves as reductionists with regard to the physiology of emotion - 
and as the resigned heirs of Andrew Solomon’s Hippocrates, regardless of whether the soul 
encapsulated as human will was of the Aristotelian or of the Platonic kind.  
But the philosophical work required to tease out how, given the nature of human 
knowledge, moral distinctions could be objectively grounded within a civil society, became 
psychiatry when the mind lost its cognitive grasp. The morally inflected philosophy of action 
we began with, originally centered on the socialized, well instructed, well brought-up 
individual, was turned on its head by the time Laclos put pen to epistolary paper. In the 
hands of Hume, it would become a sceptical philosophy of action which integrated emotions 
now recast as acts of cognition related to impressions and sentiments.42 With Hume, 
emotions were at the very root of moral awareness. Today’s neurosciences and cognitive 
sciences continue, inevitably, to take place in and to refer to a human world, in which moral 
and aesthetic values matter, in which life is supposed to have some sense - in which the 
experience of listening to Beethoven’s sonata Op. 111 has intrinsic value, and in which my 
appreciation of a friend’s gift of my favourite interpretation of the 111 truly matters. It is 








sciences, I think, cannot discover in us the seat of moral or aesthetic value, as it is sometimes 
wished: data about emotions cannot tell us what emotions are to us. They can only describe 
emotions in their own terms, and it is unfair to the science we now know to demand that it 
match the thickness of literary description. The one operates microscopically; the other, 
macroscopically. It is the unfathomability of the gap between these two dimensions that 
indicates just what is at stake when Glover’s psychiatrist faces a patient like the one 
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